COMBINED EVENT INVESTIGATION / CAUSE ANALYSIS REPORT

AOP-015 for Odors East of 241-AP Farm

EIR-2019-029 WRPS-PER-2019-1241



Figure 1. East of 241-AP Farm and approximate location of personnel when they experienced odors. Trailer in the distance is the Ultrasonic Testing Control Room Trailer.

Cause Analysis Type Approving Manager Cause Analyst ORP Facility Representative PER Discovery Date Apparent Cause Analysis



Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC

washington river protection solutions

Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy Office of River Protection

Contract No. DE-AC27-08RV14800

Event Investigator	1		7/8/19 Date
			7/8/19
PER Responsible Manager		•	Date

AOP-015 for Odors East of 241-AP Farm

AOP-015 Odor Event Summary

Event	AOP-015 for Odors East of 241-AP Farm		
PER	WRPS-PER-2019-1241		
Date/Time of Event	 June 19, 2019 0930 hours 		
Location	• East of 241-AP Farm Near Change Trailer Tent		
Personnel Affected	(4) Teamsters reported odors and having zero (0) symptoms. They elected not to receive a medical evaluation.		
Odor / Taste	Personnel described odors as: • Musty • Rotten-egg		
Industrial Hygiene (IH) Investigative Monitoring / Sampling	 Monitoring and Sampling results: Ammonia: <dl*< li=""> Total VOCs: <dl< li=""> Nitrous Oxide: 0.2 ppm Mercury: 7 ng/m³ (actionable hazard level for Mercury in 12,500 ng/m³)** Hydrogen Sulfide: <dl< li=""> *DL – detectable level **Odorless </dl<></dl<></dl*<>		
Source	• Source of the odor was traced to two (2) corroding batteries emitting sulfuric acid vapors which were located inside the Ultrasonic Testing Control Room Trailer.		
Wind Speed / Direction	NW @ 22mph, barometric pressure at 29.3"		
Waste Disturbing or Tank Work in Adjacent Area	No waste disturbing activities were occurring at the time.		
Other Work in Adjacent Area	No adjacent work was being performed at the time.		

Executive Summary

On June 19, 2019, at 0930 hours, four (4) workers were removing scrap material from an area east of AP Farm when they noticed a rotten egg odor. The individuals reported to the Central Shift Office (CSO) and filled out odor response cards, reporting no symptoms. At 1024, entry was made into procedure TF-AOP-015, *Response to Reported Odors or Unexpected Changes to Vapor Conditions* (AOP-015) for odors near AP Farm. At 1106, the Industrial Hygiene sampling team began taking direct readings and grab samples of the area. The results came back showing airborne chemicals of concern to be below actionable or detectable levels. The AOP-015 was exited at 1207 hours. Mobile lab and WRPS fugitive emissions personnel continued to investigate and discovered the source to be two corroded portable batteries located within the Ultrasonic Testing Control Room Trailer outside of AP Farm. The presence of the degraded batteries was determined not to be a vapor concern. However, the batteries did exhibit exposed battery acid. The batteries were replaced the following day. A cause analysis revealed that the batteries had a history of having a short life span. A corrective action has been recommended to perform a mechanical inspection and repair.



Event Investigation and Analysis

On June 19, 2019, at 0930 hours, four (4) teamsters were removing scrap material from an area east of AP Farm when they noticed a rotten egg odor. They promptly left the area and reported the odors to the Field Work Supervisor (FWS) who then directed them to report to the Central Shift Office (CSO). The individuals reported to the Central Shift Manager (CSM) at 1014 hours and filled out odor response cards. The individuals reported they did not experience symptoms and all four (4) declined a medical evaluation. At 1024, the Central Shift Office (CSO) sent out a shift office event notification (SOEN) to announce entry into procedure TF-AOP-015, *Response to Reported Odors or Unexpected Changes to Vapor Conditions* (AOP-015) for odors near AP Farm.

At 1025 hours, Industrial Hygiene Professionals and Technician Supervisor arrived at the CSO and were briefed by the CSM. At 1031 hours, the CSM dispatched Production Operations Nuclear Chemical Operators (NCO) to begin restricting access to the area. Industrial Hygiene personnel gathered sampling and monitoring equipment and headed to the area of concern.

At 1046 hours, an NCO in charge of Ultrasonic Testing arrived at the CSO and informed the CSM that the malfunctioning diesel generator catalytic converter was the probable cause of the odor. It should be noted at ~0900 hours that day, similar odors had been encountered. At 1106, Industrial Hygiene Technicians (IHT) began performing response actions by acquiring two (2) grab samples: one from the area near the suspect generator and the other from the general area. Sampling was also gathered via the Terra Graphics Industrial Hygiene Response Van (TGIHRV). At 1117, an Event Investigation was initiated.

At 1128, IHTs reported to the CSM that direct reading instruments showed ammonia, volatile organic compounds (VOC), and hydrogen sulfide to be below detectable levels. At 1203, the CSM was informed that the survey on the grab samples had been completed and chemicals of concern were below actionable or detectable levels. At 1209, the AOP-015 was exited.

The TGIHRV (i.e., mobile lab) continued to investigate and discovered the source of the odors. Initially, the TGIHRV team had been focused on the diesel generators as the possible source, but new information led them to investigate the trailer just south of the generators, the Ultrasonic Testing Control Room Trailer (i.e., UT trailer). At ~1330, the Field Work Supervisor (FWS) from the Ultrasonic Testing Control Room Trailer opened the storage area at the front of the UT trailer and the investigating technicians immediately detected a strong sewer/rotten egg smell being emitted from two corroded lead batteries inside (Figure 2).

WRPS fugitive emissions personnel were also at the location investigating the incident. They detected the presence of sulfuric compounds using two Shinyei units coming from the opened storage area of the UT trailer. Both instruments reached maximum detection within a few feet of the batteries. The wind was moving at 22 mph that day and in a northwesterly direction which would have placed the affected individuals downwind from the UT Trailer; providing further evidence to support the theory that the batteries were the source.

The event was concluded to be a low level hazard and an isolated incident. The chemicals of concern (e.g., hydrogen sulfide) were not detected in the airborne samples collected by Industrial Hygiene and the presence of the degraded batteries was determined not to be a vapor concern. However, the batteries did exhibit exposed battery acid.



A Cause Analysis was performed to further explore the presence of the degraded batteries. The analysis discovered that the UT trailer had a recent history of batteries malfunctioning. In April 2018 and in August 2018, the batteries were replaced. Recently, on June 6, 2019, the UT trailer had been relocated from AN Farm to AP Farm. The DC batteries had been utilized and were functioning properly at the time. However, on June 19, 2019, the batteries were found to be in a state of corrosion with dried battery acid found on and around the batteries. The batteries had likely overcharged which resulted in the boiling off/over of battery acid. In the past, the UT crew had been manually disconnecting the battery from the generator-fed source to prevent the overcharging.

The cause of the overcharged/degraded batteries will require a mechanical inspection. Based on an interview with a mechanic from Mission Support Alliance (MSA) who is familiar with the battery issues of the UT trailer, the cause is likely a malfunctioning converter. Under normal conditions, the trailer would draw power from the AP Farm generator, and the converter would then convert the 110 volts from the generator to 12 volts for the DC battery. Under normal conditions, the converter would discontinue providing power to the battery when it reached the full 12 volts. However, in the instance of the UT trailer, it is likely that power continued to the battery causing it to become overcharged.

The cause analysis recommends conducting a mechanical inspection and then performing the necessary repairs to ensure that the batteries are not being overcharged.

Event Timeline

June 19, 2019

- 0930 Four (4) employees notice rotten egg odors east of AP Farm
- 0930 Affected employees leave area and return to MO733
- 0945 Employees inform FWS
- 0945 FWS prompts employees to report to CSO and fill out odor cards
- 1014 Affected employees report odors to CSM
- 1024 SOEN goes out announcing entry into TF-AOP-015
- 1025 Industrial Hygiene Professionals and Technician Supervisor arrive at CSO
- 1027 Industrial Hygiene Personnel begin gathering monitoring and sampling equipment
- 1031 CSM dispatches NCOs to perform access restriction
- 1035 Terra Graphics Industrial Hygiene Response Van (TGIHRV) team arrives at CSO
- 1046 Ultrasonic Testing NCO arrives at CSO and informs CSM that malfunctioning generator catalytic converter is likely cause of odors
- 1050 IHTs are briefed on response actions
- 1051 IHTs depart to begin monitoring and sampling response actions
- 1100 AY/AZ Field Industrial Hygiene Professional contacts AY/AZ Team Industrial Hygiene Technician in search of additional information on time and area of event
- 1100 AY/AZ IHT informs of similar odors encountered ~0900 hours but direct read instrumentation (DRI) did not detect hazardous airborne conditions
- 1106 IHTs enter restricted area and begin response actions
- 1117 Event Investigation (EIR-2019-029) is initiated
- 1128 IHTs report to CSO that ammonia, VOCs, and hydrogen sulfide are below detectable
- 1203 CSM is informed that survey on grab samples is complete and below detectable
- 1207 SOEN is issued to exit TF-AOP-015
- 1430 Data gathered by the TGIHRV team identify a positive source of the odors: corroded batteries in the Ultrasonic Testing Trailer

June 20, 2019

0930 Batteries are replaced in the Ultrasonic Testing Control Room Trailer

Immediate Actions Taken

On June 19, 2019, at 0930 hours, workers experience strong rotten egg odors and leave the area. Workers then reported the incident to the FWS. The workers then reported to the CSO and filled out odor response cards. At 1024, a SOEN announces entry into the TF-AOP-015 and personnel are directed to stay clear of AP Farm until further notice. Nuclear Chemical Operators (NCO) are directed to set up access restriction. At 1106, IHTs begin monitoring and sampling. By 1203 hours, the CSM is informed that chemicals of concern are at or below background levels. At 1209 hours, the TF-AOP-015 was exited and normal access is resumed.

Remedial Actions Taken

Source of the odors was identified to be corroded lead acid batteries located at the front of the nearby UT trailer. The batteries were replaced the next day on June 20, 2019.

Extent of Condition

The instance of the batteries being corroded due to overcharging appears to be an isolated incident as there is currently only one UT trailer located at the Tank Farms. The UT trailer is a temporary trailer unit (Figure 1) equipped with tank detection equipment used primarily for the inspection of the structural integrity of double-shell tanks (DST). It has been utilized at various DST farms since it was commissioned. Two additional UT trailers are to be added in the future.

Cause Analysis

A Cause Analysis was performed to further explore the presence of the degraded batteries. A Cause-Effect chart shows the process of analyzing the events leading up to the discovery (Figure 4). The analysis found that the UT trailer had a recent history of batteries malfunctioning. In April 2018 and in August 2018, the batteries had been replaced. Recently, on June 6, 2019, the UT trailer had been relocated from AN Farm to AP Farm. The DC batteries had been utilized and were functioning properly at that time. However, on June 19, 2019, the batteries were found to be in a state of corrosion with dried battery acid found on and around the batteries. The batteries had likely overcharged which resulted in the boiling off/over of battery acid. In the past, the UT crew had been manually disconnecting the battery from the generator-fed source to prevent the overcharging.

The cause of the overcharged/degraded batteries will require a mechanical inspection. Based on an interview with a mechanic from Mission Support Alliance (MSA) who is familiar with the battery issues of the UT trailer, the cause is likely a malfunctioning converter. Under normal conditions, the trailer would draw power from the AP Farm generator, and the converter would then convert the 110 volts from the generator to 12 volts for the DC battery. Under normal conditions, the converter would discontinue providing power to the battery when it reached the full 12 volts. However, in the instance of the UT trailer, it is likely that power continued to the battery causing it to become overcharged.

Corrective Action

- 1. Equipment Malfunction
 - **Cause Code:** A2B6C04 End of life failure
 - ESTARS: WRPS-PER-2019-1241.1
 - Action: Submit KSR to MSA for facility electricians to inspect and diagnose. Specify in the notes of the request that this is a mobile trailer but due to high voltage levels, the work needs to be assigned to facility electricians. Note to check the converter and recommend repairs.
 - **Deliverable:** Upload to ESTARS a copy of the inspection results and recommendations from the MSA facility electricians. If additional actions are recommended as a result of the MSA inspections, those actions will be added to this PER.
 - **Responsible Manager:** Mike Hay
 - **Due Date:** 9/30/2019

Attachments:

- 1. WRPS-PER-2019-1241
- 2. Industrial Hygiene Investigative Report



Attachment 1 – WRPS-PER-2019-1241

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Problem Evaluation Requ	est (PER)		Sav WRPS-PER-2019-124
			In Process/W
PER No	WRPS-PER-2019-1241		
Discovery Date/Time	06/19/2019 09:40		
Project	Maintenance		
ocation	AP Farm		
low Discovered?	Self-Revealing (Event)		
quipment ID Number	N/A		
Source Document	N/A		
PR Title			
Odor Event AP Farm			
Description of Concern or Probl	em		
Feamsters working outside AP chai	nge tent smelt a onion sm	ell	
mmediate actions Taken	107		
eft area called supervisor did not v shift office filled out odor response	vant to go to HPMC super cards.	visor called shift office reported	l event AOP 15 intiated, went to
Recommended Corrective Actio	ns		
v/A			
Shift Office Contact	Originator indicates cont	act was made with the appropr	iate Shift Office.
Driginator Contact			
10			
Originators Name	Originators ID	Originators Phone	Date Initiated
	-		06/19/2019
	SHIFT OF	FICE REVIEW	
Reportability	Non-Reportable		
SSC Operability	N/A		
Operability Review	N/A		
OSD Non-Compliance?	No		
Compensatory Actions Taken	1		
No compensatory measures impler	nented.		
Additional Actions Taken or Red	commended		
Entered TF-AOP-015 Response to F access to the east side of AP Farm Plan IHP-09001 using TF-AOP-015 results are at or below background Event East of AP Farm. Source of t in the UT Trailer.	Reported Odors or Unexpe by blocking 4th Street Loo RPF Task 2. Response act levels. Exited TF-AOP-01. he TF-AOP-015 odors nea	cted Changes to Vapor Condition op. Dispatched IHTs to implem ions for the TF-AOP-015 event 5. Initiated Event Investigation r AP Farm have been positively	ons. Dispatched NCOs to restric ent Tank Waste Odor Sample have been completed and the EIR 2019-029 TF-AOP-015 identified as corroded batteries
50 Reviewer Name	SO Reviewer ID	SO Reviewer Phone	SO Review Date
			06/19/2019
	SCR	EENING	
ER Significance Level	Analysis Level		How Discovered
Ind Assessment Rev	Occurrence Rpt #	DOE CAP Required?	
	Excilition Rop / SSO	Safaty Mamt Ban	Potentially Recurring
Assigned Responsible Manager	Facilities Rep / 550	Salety Myllit Kep	Issue

6/20/2019

PER

Event Investigation / Apparent Cause Analysis WRPS-PER-2019-1241 AOP-015 for Odors East of 241-AP Farm

PER

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Program		Trend Codes			
PER Screening Comments					
ORPS Code	Functional Area	Work Process	ISMS		
PER Screening Chair	PER Screening Chair ID	PER Screening Chair Phone	PER Screening Date		
		() -			
	PAAA R	EVIEW			
PAAA Screening	PAAA Codes	Function Codes			
PAAA Cause Analysis Review	NTS Report Number	NTS Report Date			
PAAA Screening Comments					
	24004274000 07 2006 10 10b	1			
PAAA Reviewer Name	PAAA Review Date				
PAAA Approver Name	PAAA Approve Date				
	ATTAC	IMENTS			
Link to PER	ATTAG				
	AUDIT H	IISTORY			
Change Date	Auditor	Comments			
06/19/2019 14:44		Initiator Tab initial submission.			
06/19/2019 15:44		'PER Title' was changed to change "order" to "odor". 'Immediate actions Taken' was changed to change "order" to "odor".			
06/19/2019 16:50		SO Tab initial submission.			

--- End of Report --06/20/2019 06:10 AM

6/20/2019

Attachment 2 – Industrial Hygiene Investigative Report

TF-AOP-015 INDUSTR	PER Number: WRPS-PER-2019-12		
Time/Date & Event location: 0930 06/19/2019 East of 241-AP F	EIR Number: EIR-2019-029		
1. Event Summary (including nu	mber of workers involv	red and activity in progress).	
4 Maintenance Teamsters rem affected employees reported s	toving scrap wood E of symptoms.	241-AP encountered "musty, rotten	egg" odors. No
Was an IHT Present du	ring initiating event? [] Yes [X] No	
IH Monitoring/ Sample Survey	Reports:		
Event response: 19-0	4750 "AP Farm East P	erimeter AOP 15 response"	
Weather Conditions at Time of	Event:		
Ambient outside conditions:			
 Weather station: Wind Direction and Speed Barometric Pressure (steed) Temperature (F°): Humidity: 	d: ady/rising/falling):	Station 6 @ 0930 NW @ 22 mph, gusts to 34 29.31"Hg and steady 70 23%	
	Dage	1 of 10	

Washington River Protection Solutions TF-AOP-015 INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE INVESTIGATION REPORT	PER Number: WRPS-PER-2019-1241
Time/Date & Event location: 0930 06/19/2019 East of 241-AP Farm	EIR Number: BIR-2019-029
Field Response Timeline:	
 1014: Affectad Employees report odors to Central Shift Manager (CSM) 1024: Shift Office Event Notification (SOEN): "Entered AOP-015 for odor near AP F clear of AP Farm until further notice. CSM" 1025: AN Team Field Industrial Hygiene Professional (ANFIHP), COMs Field Industrial Hygiene Professional (COMsFIHP), AV/AZ Field Industrial Hygiene Professional (AVA Operations Shift Industrial Hygiene Technician Supervisor (POSIHTS) arrive a (CSO), acquire Odor Response Cards (ORCa) and are briefed by CSM 1027: COMsFIHP requests POSIHTS to acquire Hydrogen Suffide (H₂S) sensor equitation Operations Shift Industrial Hygiene Technicians (POSIHTS) arrive at CSO is production Operations Shift Industrial Hygiene Technicians (POSIHTS) are requested to CSO 1032: Effluent Treatment Facility Industrial Hygiene Technician (ETHT) departs M HHT Lab) towards Effluent Operations Shift Nuclear Chemical Operators (PP access restriction 1033: CSM dispatches Production Operations Shift Nuclear Chemical Operators (PI access restriction 1034: POSIHTS confirms Nucon HAPSITE® is warming up 1035: TGETIs arrive at CSO 1036: ANFIHP briefs TGETs 1036: POSIHTS depart CSO to acquire Respiratory Protection Equipment (RPE) 1038: TGETIs leave CSO 1044: Ultrasonic Testing Nuclear Chemical Operator Lead (UTNCOL) arrives at CSI malfunctioning diseage generator catalytic converter is probable cause of odor malfunctioning diseage denerator catalytic converter is probable cause of odor 1047: POSIHTS return to CSO with RPE for briefing on response actions 1050: COMsFIHP briefs POSIHTs on response actions: RPE as per RPF TF-AOP-015 Task 2 Monitoring as per IHP-09001 R8 Acquire 2 grab samples 1 grab sample form area near suspect generator 1 grab sample form area near suspect generator 1 grab sample form mersonae actions 1051: UTNCOL contacts CSM to update that contact	arm. All personnel stay strial Hygiene ZFIHP), Production at Central Shift Office upped MultiRAE at CSO IO511 (Temporary PO AutiRAE OSNCOS) to perform rial Hygiene Response O to notify CSM that Contractor Interface agarding Enhanced adings were observed ort Point Of Contact
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and the second se	5 INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE INVESTIGATION REPORT	WRPS-PER-2019-124	
me /Date & Event k 930 06/19/2019 Eas	e/Date & Event location: 0 06/19/2019 East of 241-AP Farm		
330 06/19/2019 Eat Glossary: AOP ANFIHP AYAZFIHP ASAP COMs COMS	Abnormal Operating Procedure AN Team Field Industrial Hygiene Professional AY/AZ Team Field Industrial Hygiene Professional As Soon As Possible Central Operations and Maintenance Central Operations and Maintenance Field Industrial Hygiene Professi Central Operations and Maintenance Field Industrial Hygiene Professi Central Shift Manager Central Shift Office (274AW Room 5) Chemical Vapors Solutions Team Detection Limit Event Investigation Report Environmental Safety Health and Quality Effluent Treatment Facility Effluent Treatment Facility Industrial Hygiene Technician Evaporator Ev Team Field Industrial Hygiene Professional Fugitive Emissions Investigation Fugitive Emissions Sub-Team Hydrogen Sulfide Mercury Hollie P. Mooers Corporation Industrial Hygiene Programs Industrial Hygiene Technician Lead Industrial Hygiene Programs Industrial Hygiene Technician Lead Industrial Hygiene Technician Mobile Office Nitrous Oxide Ammonia Operating Engineer Odor Response Card Production Operations Industrial Hygiene Technician Lead Production Operations Industrial Hygiene Technician Production Operations Industrial Hygiene Technician Lead Production Operations Industrial Hygiene Technician Production Operations Industrial Hygiene Technician Production Operations Industrial Hygiene Technician Production Operations Industrial Hygiene Technician Production Operations Shift Industrial Hygiene Technician Shift Manager Tank Emms	EIR-2019-029	
IGET	Terra Graphics Engineering Technician		

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TF-AOP-0	Washington River Protection Solutions 15 INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE INVESTIGATION REPORT	PER Number WRPS-PER-2019-		
Time/Date & Even 0930 06/19/2019 E	Time/Date & Event location: 0930 06/19/2019 East of 241-AP Farm			
Classes (
Glossary (C	sont.):			
UTNCOL	Ultrasonic Testing Nuclear Control Operator Lead			
VOC	Volatile Organic Compounds			
1				
Field IH Auth	ior:			
		5 - I		
PIIR Past and	Less reame Signature Phone	No. 04[25]2		
1				
	Page 4 of 10	A-6005-744 (F		

Washington River P TF-AOP-015 INDUSTRIAL HYGI	PER Number: WRPS-PER-2019-12	
Firme/Date & Event location: 0930 06/19/2019 East of 241-AP Farm	EIR Number: EIR-2019-029	
2. GCMS Sample Results:		
See Attachment A for HAPSITE (GCMS) Res	sults	
×		









TF-AOP-01	15 INDUSTRI	AL HYGIENE INVESTIGATION REPORT	PER Number: WRPS-PER-2019-1241
Time/Date & Event 0930 06/19/2019 Ea	location: ast of 241-AP Fa	m	EIR Number: EIR-2019-029
• Summa	ry of IH Monitorir	ng and Sampling Data:	
a. Mor	litoring:		
	Event Respon	se: 19-04750 "AP Farm East Perimeter AOP 15 response	e "
DR	l field readings:		
	VOC: NH3: H2S:	<dl <dl <dl< th=""><th></th></dl<></dl </dl 	
Gn	ab samples:		
	VOC:	<dl< td=""><td></td></dl<>	
	NH3:	<dl Z na/m3</dl 	
	N ₂ O:		
	H₂S:	<dl< td=""><td></td></dl<>	
b. Sam N/A	pling:		
4. Summary of Em	ployee Reporte	d Information (e.g., symptoms)	
None of the em	ployees reported	experiencing symptoms	
5. <u>Recommendation</u>	ons/Conclusion	<u>s:</u>	
Identification of S Lead acid batteri the reported odo appeared to be o reported during t	Source of the Co es located in the r. When the stor overcharged. (Se his AOP-015.	ncern: [X] Yes [] No front of a nearby Ultrasonic Testing Control Room-Trailer age area containing the batteries is opened, the odor beca e Attachment B) Over charged lead acid batteries can ge	r is the likely the source of ame stronger. The batteries nerate odors similar to those
6. Other:			
The Terra Graph response (see Se reportable. The T TGIHRV have ye	ics Industrial Hyp ac. 1 Field Respo GIHRV is still in t to be accredite	giene Response Van (TGIHRV) was deployed to collect donse Timeline); however, no data collected during this event the research and development phase and any analytical donary analytical donary recognized organization (AIHA, etc.).	ata as part of the AOP-015 ant by the TGIHRV is methods associated with the
S&H Program	Management:		
			chela
PINH PASE BIO LE	ist iverne	Phone No.	G/#5/17 Dete
NG 20, 19 20, 51, 57, 57,		Page 10 of 10	A-6005-744 (REV 5)

Attachment A GCMS Laboratory Results

HAPSITE GC-MS Bag Sample Results Survey 19-004750, East of AP Tank Farm: (EIR-2019-029).

Two bag samples were collected in response to an odor reported east of AP Tank Farm. These samples were analyzed using an Inficon HAPSITE GC-MS on June 19, 2019. Data was interpreted on May 20, 2019, and reported the same day. Results for the Air Blank Sample were satisfactory. A Bag sample containing contaminant free Zero Air was analyzed. The compounds listed below were found in both samples and the zero air-sample bag blank at concentrations consistent with sample bag contaminants.

Compounds Found in Samples

Compound	Clean Air Blank	Zero Air-Bag Blank	Bag #1	Bag #2	Comments
Internal Standard #1	Х	X	X	Х	Added by instrument during analysis
Plasticizer (Methyl Methacrylate)		X	X	X	Typical sample bag component
Internal Standard #2	Х	X	X	X	Added by instrument during analysis
C8 Aromatic Compound (Styrene)		X			Typical sample bag component
C10 Terpene (D-Limonene)		X	X	X	Typical sample bag component
Silane Compound (Tetramethylsilane)		X	X	X	Typical sample bag component
C9-15 Alkane Hydrocarbons		Х	X	Х	Not found above background

No compounds were found at concentrations above background.



Attachment B Photo of Lead Acid batteries

